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COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY:
LIBERALISM, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT,
AND THE NEXT STEP FORWARD

Capital punishment is predicated in part on the notion that collective, utilitarian justice, as embodied in the state, should supersede individual rights.
The tension between the greater good and our instinctive understanding of
the rights of the individual is a problem for the modern democratic state.
Recall, for example, that the lynchings and race riots that accompanied the
Ku Klux Klan’s resurgence in the early twentieth century were generally
justified by appeals to the greater good. Society depends on some individual
subordination to the collective good, but when matters of life and death are
involved, a liberal democracy should proceed cautiously.
Western liberal democracies have long been considered the crowning
political achievement of the Enlightenment. American revolutionaries fought
a bloody war that gave voice and content to such abstract Enlightenment
ideals as liberty, tolerance, due process, and the value of the individual.
Liberal democratic institutions have improved countless lives, yet for all
the good that it has done, modern post-enlightenment liberalism remains
glaringly imperfect. Capital punishment is one of its most notable eyesores,
putting into bold relief the tension between our perceived (but sometimes
erroneous) notions of the collective good and our resistance to sacrificing
individual rights. Execution of the innocent, and administering a system
that discriminates on racial and class grounds, offends notions of fairness
and justice even as the state claims to act on behalf of us all.1
Capital punishment is anathema to liberal notions of human rights and
civil liberties. It is time to finally cast it aside as an anachronistic vestige
of bygone times. The death penalty is fundamentally incompatible with a
truly liberal state.
American history is replete with hypocrisies, contradictions, and imperfections. The United States was conceived in the genocide of Indigenous
Nations2 and weaned on slavery.3 The death penalty, like these other horrors,
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is a vestige of our medieval past that the framers of our Constitution chose
not to abolish.4 It is past time we remedied this error.

Philosophical Liberalism and the Death Penalty
I. History, Nature and Value in Liberal Enlightenment Philosophy
Liberalism is a political philosophy that emphasizes the protection of
individual liberty as the chief concern of the state.5 Liberalism has evolved
into multiple strands. It includes a broad intellectual school of thought
with subspecies ranging from modern-day democratic socialism to market
libertarianism with multiple threads on a continuum in between.6 At its
core, liberalism stands for a few unshakable principles: the consent of the
governed, individualism, egalitarianism, and human dignity. These basic
principles (with grotesque exceptions, including slavery, genocide of native
inhabitants, and subordination of women) were at the heart of the republic’s
revolutionary founding.
Liberalism is a product of the Age of Enlightenment, which itself was the
product of the Scientific Revolution, which marked an emergence out of the
thousand-year Christian Dark Ages.7 Feudalism only began to recede in the
sixteenth century. Moreover, before the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the
dominant political authority throughout much of Western Europe was the
Catholic Church. With a few notable exceptions, concepts like individual
liberty and the consent of the governed remained a distant concern.
Modern liberalism can trace its most influential origins to the work of
English philosopher John Locke who, in 1689, first wrote of legitimate political authority as stemming from the consent of the governed and of the
legitimate function of government being the protection of natural rights.8
Although Locke owed much to earlier social contract theorists like Hugo
Grotius and Thomas Hobbes, Locke’s emphasis on the natural rights of the
individual made a unique contribution. He argued that these natural rights,
identified by Locke as life, liberty, and estate, emanated from outside the
political sphere and were not derivative of the authority of the state.9 It was
then revolutionary to think of the individual as having rights apart from
the body politic.
Early Enlightenment political philosophers like Locke and his earlier
contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, promoted the social contract theory—the
idea that individuals consent to subordinate some of their natural rights to a
central authority in exchange for peace and security. Hobbes famously wrote
that without the protections of organized society, life would be “solitary,
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poor, nasty, brutish and short,”10 and that when “all men have equal right
unto all things,” life becomes “a mere war of all against all.”11 This barbarity,
Hobbes argued, was sufficient justification for the government to replace
the natural rights of the individual, and to impose order through the “terror of some power.”12 Locke, while conceding the necessity of government
imposition of order, did not believe the social contract required bargaining
away all of our natural rights to a kind of absolute state power, as Hobbes
did. According to Locke, when the state denies natural rights to an inordinate and intolerable extent, it loses its legitimacy, and political revolution
becomes a moral necessity.13 Thomas Jefferson and other members of the
Continental Congress took this lesson to heart.
In 1762, the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau elaborated on social contract theory, arguing, “[L]et us agree that force doesn’t create right,
and that legitimate powers are the only ones we are obliged to obey.”14 At
the dawn of the U.S. revolution, the pamphleteer and rabble-rouser Thomas
Paine described social contract theory this way: “It is a perversion of terms
to say that a charter gives rights. It operates by a contrary effect—that of
taking rights away. Rights are inherently in all the inhabitants; but charters,
by annulling those rights, in the majority, leave the right, by exclusion, in
the hands of a few . . . and consequently are instruments of injustice.”15
Whereas the abdication of some natural rights to government was a “necessary evil,”16 to Paine the creep of the tyranny of the majority was forever
to be kept in check with skepticism and vigilance.
The idea of natural rights and the social contract that exists between the
citizenry and a legitimate state that was conceived by Locke, elaborated
upon by Rousseau, and fretted over by Paine, were the pulsing intellectual
heart of the American Revolution. The Founding Fathers were convinced
of the merits of these fundamental ideas. The Declaration of Independence,
the Constitution, and our Constitution’s Bill of Rights are all pregnant with
Enlightenment ideas about the relationship between liberty and the state.
These ideals form the very essence of what many patriotic Americans like
to think about themselves today, and they are the ideals that we continually
hold up to the world and to ourselves—ideals that this article will demonstrate are fundamentally incongruous with capital punishment.
The death penalty is the ultimate illiberal triumph of the state over the individual. The social contract at the heart of liberalism requires us all to give up
some of our natural-born liberties to live in society, but when the state demands
a life, it demands too much. When the state claims the right to take a life, even
of one who commits a heinous and unforgiveable crime, it forgets its place.
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II. The Death Penalty in History
Since humans began to organize themselves into groups, these groups
have always put to death those they deemed the worst transgressors of their
norms. What constitutes a capital crime, however, has varied wildly, as have
the categories of people against whom the death penalty could be applied
and the procedures governing how the death penalty may be carried out.
Hammurabi, in seventeenth century BCE Babylonia, issued a code of
civil and criminal law that warranted death as punishment for 25 distinct
transgressions, including robbery, incest, abetting conspiracy, and leaving
the city gates with a slave—murderers, however, received a lesser punishment.17 Hammurabi’s Code was also scaled for different classes of people
with different punishments for slaves and freemen, women and men, with
the disfavored classes earning death for their transgressions while the
privileged could escape with a fine.18
In sixth century Athens, the democratically elected legislator, Draco,
replaced the oral laws and traditions of the city-state with a written code
that prescribed execution for almost all crimes, including murder, cabbage
thievery, sacrilege, and idleness.19 When asked why Draco had converted
so many offenses into capital crimes, the Greek biographer and historian
Plutarch reported that in Draco’s opinion, “the lesser [crimes] deserved
it, and for the greater ones no heavier penalty could be found.”20 A few
centuries later, the philosopher Socrates was famously sentenced to death
for impiety and corrupting the youth under a different Athenian regime.21
Similarly, the Hebrew Bible details many crimes for which death was
required in ancient Israel, including murder, cursing a parent, blasphemy,
adultery, homosexuality, bestiality, and working on the sabbath.22 Later,
in medieval Europe, capital crimes included murder, rape, arson, treason,
witchcraft, and intermarriage between Jew and gentile.23 In just the two
centuries of the Spanish Inquisition from the thirteenth through fifteenth
centuries, thousands of people were put to death for crimes including heresy,
witchcraft, blasphemy, and sodomy, among other transgressions.24
Later, the eighteenth century British Parliament enacted England’s
Bloody Code, making 222 crimes punishable by death, including murder, treason, arson, cutting down a tree, the robbing of a rabbit warren,
and the theft of goods worth more than twelve pence, which was about
one-twentieth of the weekly wage for a skilled worker.25 In the British
American colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the capital laws of New England listed idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, buggery,
adultery, and rebellion as among the many offenses that warranted the
death penalty.26 In New York, the Duke’s Laws warranted the death penalty for denying the true god or traitorous denial of the King’s rights.27
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III. Liberalism’s First Efforts to Rein In the Death Penalty
One of the first checks on the state’s power to inflict punishments arbitrarily came with John Lackland’s defeat at Runnymede, culminating in the
Magna Carta in 1215.28 In the Magna Carta, the English king ceded some
of his authority to a group of noblemen in exchange for their support. The
Magna Carta’s Lex Terrae clause stated that
“[n]o Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his freehold,
or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise
destroyed; nor will we not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by lawful
judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.”29

This was perhaps the first emergence of the rule of law as a check against
the unrestrained authority of the state.
The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 followed nearly a century of litigation
involving the power of the courts to use habeas corpus as a writ of freedom
as well as earlier parliamentary efforts to expand the writ’s ambit.30 Proposed by the English Parliament and assented to by the King, it required
judicial review of the crown’s decisions to hold prisoners.31 A decade later,
the dynastic and religious conflict between Protestant and Catholic branches
of the house of Stuart brought about the Glorious Revolution, after which
the winning faction, led by William of Orange and Mary II, assented to the
English Bill of Rights of 1689.32 Among other things, the English Bill of
Rights prohibited the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments.33 The
Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 and the English Bill of Rights of 1689 were
major influences on the American revolutionaries when those revolutionaries
were drafting their own social compact a century later.34
Ratified in 1791, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits
cruel and unusual punishments and is the legal provision under which abolition of the death penalty is most likely to be won.35 The Eighth Amendment
owes its inclusion in the Bill of Rights to the great orator of liberty (and
slaveholder) Patrick Henry. Fearing that the absence of an explicit prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments would allow for government
overreach and oppression, he cautioned the Virginia ratifying convention
that “they will tell you that there is such a necessity of strengthening the
arm of government, that they must have a criminal equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more relentless severity. We
are then lost and undone.”36 The Eighth Amendment is a direct product of
such liberal skepticism.
The trouble with the Eighth Amendment, as with most provisions of the
Bill of Rights, is its indefiniteness. What, exactly, is meant by “cruel and
unusual punishment” was left purposefully vague by those who drafted and
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ratified it. We know capital punishment was regularly employed throughout
the several states and by the emerging federal government. Capital crimes in
many of the states included arson, piracy, treason, murder, sodomy, burglary,
robbery, rape, horse-stealing, slave rebellion, and counterfeiting.37 In 1790,
one of the first acts of the new national Congress was to enumerate federal
crimes worthy of the death penalty, including treason, counterfeiting of
federal records, murder, disfigurement, and robbery committed in federal
jurisdictions or on the high seas.38 The prescribed punishment was “hanging the person convicted by the neck until dead.”39 Hangings were a public
spectacle in the United States from the colonial era until the mid-nineteenth
century, when reformers began to argue that the display was, if not cruel,
then at least in poor taste. By 1850, the majority of states had switched to
more modest, privately conducted executions.40 Extra-judicial lynchings,
of course, continued to plague the nation well into the twentieth century.

IV. Recent U.S. Supreme Court Cases on Capital Punishment
Trop v. Dulles is a 1958 Supreme Court case involving a soldier facing
denationalization as punishment for wartime desertion.41 The Court recognized that the words “cruel and unusual punishment” were “not precise, and
that their scope is not static[,]”42 concluding that the Eighth Amendment
“must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.”43 The Court found for the first time, 167
years after the Eighth Amendment was ratified, that loss of citizenship was
too cruel and unusual a punishment to withstand constitutional scrutiny.
More importantly, the case established that the protections afforded to the
individual in a social contract with the state can expand and grow as societal norms change. Unsurprisingly, the case invited a flurry of challenges
to the death penalty.
Since 1958, there have been two distinct tracks for challenging the death
penalty as being violative of the Eighth Amendment. One attacks the procedures involved in imposing death sentences.44 This track includes both broad
attacks on the constitutionality of the death penalty under all circumstances
and narrower attacks on procedural aspects affecting trials and appeals in
capital cases. The second track addresses the categories of people upon
whom the death penalty can be imposed.45 Advocates proceeding on both
tracks have succeeded in reducing the application of the death penalty.
The most significant attack on the death penalty came in 1972, in Furman
v. Georgia.46 In Furman, the Court consolidated cases involving one inmate
convicted of murder in Georgia and two convicted of rape—one in Georgia
and the other in Texas. All of the inmates challenged the imposition of the

counter-revolutionary

135

death penalty as cruel and unusual. In a one-paragraph per curium opinion,
the Court held that not only were the death penalty regimes in these two
states unconstitutional, but that because every other capital jurisdiction in
the U.S. had similar capital regimes, all were unconstitutional. This led to
a four-year moratorium on the death penalty during which states passed
new statutes they hoped would survive constitutional muster. During this
time, 558 prisoners on death row had their sentences commuted to life in
prison.47 Two hundred forty-three were ultimately released from prison.48
There were a number of concurring opinions in Furman. Three justices
found the death penalty to be impermissibly arbitrary as applied, affecting
not the worst offenders but a randomly selected handful.49 Justice Potter
Stewart famously wrote that “[t]hese death sentences are cruel and unusual
in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual” and
concluded that “the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the
infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique
penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed.”50 Two Justices found
the death penalty to be cruel and unusual in all circumstances. “Today
death is a uniquely and unusually severe punishment. When examined by
the principles applicable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
death stands condemned as fatally offensive to human dignity.”51
Four years after Furman, after reconfiguring its capital punishment statute, Georgia was once again before the Supreme Court with a prisoner it
hoped to execute. In Gregg v. Georgia52 the Supreme Court authorized the
execution of a death row inmate who had been convicted and sentenced in
a process ostensibly designed to eliminate the arbitrariness that had made
the death penalty constitutionally repugnant in Furman. In allowing the
state to proceed, the Supreme Court held that capital punishment did not
violate the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances.53 The Court approved
a process that laid down some guardrails, narrowed the definition of capital crimes, and bifurcated the trial into separate guilt and penalty phases.
These changes were supposed to supply objective criteria to guide a jury’s
sentencing discretion54 and provide opportunity for the jury to hear and
consider mitigating and aggravating circumstances, thus winnowing the
ultimate penalty down to those most deserving of death.55 Finally, the Court
required a meaningful appellate process.56 With those protections in place
to guard against the arbitrariness found in Furman, the Court once again
gave its blessing to the state’s use of the death penalty.57
After the Court held that capital punishment could proceed within certain
procedural parameters, death penalty opponents tried to mitigate the damage. Opponents reasoned that if the death penalty was not de facto cruel
and unusual, perhaps it was cruel and unusual when applied under certain
circumstances and to certain groups.
In Coker v. Georgia58 in 1977, a death row inmate challenged a death
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sentence imposed for the rape of an adult woman. The Supreme Court held
that the s entence was grossly disproportionate and excessive in relation
to the crime.59 Though the Court recognized that rape was “highly reprehensible” and “the ultimate violation of self[,]”60 it reasoned that because
the death penalty is “unique in its severity and irrevocability[,]” it should
not be imposed for a crime that does not “involve the unjustified taking of
human life.”61 In Kennedy v. Louisiana in 2008, the Court held that the
death penalty could not be imposed for the rape of a child, limiting capital
punishment exclusively to murder. “Difficulties in administering the penalty
to ensure against its arbitrary and capricious application require adherence
to a rule reserving its use, at this stage of evolving standards and in cases
of crimes against individuals, for crimes that take the life of the victim.”62
In Enmund v. Florida63 in 1982, the Court considered the case of an inmate
who had been sentenced to death for his peripheral role in a homicide.64 The
Court held that it violated the Eighth Amendment to impose on a murderer
and his or her accomplice identical sentences when the accomplice did not
intend to kill. “[P]unishment must be tailored to [] personal responsibility and moral guilt.”65 Capital punishment in the absence of intentional
wrongdoing is “unconstitutionally excessive.”66 In Tison v. Arizona67 in
1987, however, the Court allowed capital punishment in a case where an
accomplice to murder demonstrated a reckless indifference to the value of
human life which, the Court held, can be “every bit as shocking to the moral
sense as an intent to kill.”68
In Thompson v. Oklahoma69 in 1988, an inmate who was sentenced to death
for a crime committed when he was 15 years old challenged his sentence.
The Court found it unlikely that a teenage offender could undertake “the
kind of cost-benefit analysis that attaches any weight to the possibility of
execution” and that “it is fanciful to believe that he would be deterred by
the knowledge that a small number of persons his age have been executed
during the 20th century.”70 Because the death penalty could not be expected
to make “any measurable contribution to the goals that capital punishment
is intended to achieve[,]” the Court deemed it “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.”71
Then, in 1989, a challenge came from a death-sentenced prisoner who
was 17 years old at the time he committed a murder.72 The Supreme Court
refused to extend Thompson, finding neither “historical nor [] modern
societal consensus forbidding the imposition of capital punishment on any
person who murders at 16 or 17 years of age.”73 The Court overruled itself
a mere 16 years later; in Roper v. Simmons,74 a 5-4 Court found a national
consensus in prohibiting capital punishment for juvenile offenders.75 The
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society had apparently, but barely, evolved.
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In a 2002 case out of Virginia, Daryl Adkins, an intellectually-disabled
inmate, challenged the imposition of his death sentence.76 There, the Court
was “not persuaded that the execution of mentally retarded criminals will
measurably advance the deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death
penalty” and found that Eighth Amendment “places a substantive restriction on the State’s power to take the life of a mentally retarded offender.”77
The history of capital punishment has reflected a transformation of the
institution from an unrestrained terror wielded against those who found
themselves on the wrong side of power78 to a scarcely used vestige that
society finds more and more unpalatable.
In the four decades since the Furman moratorium and Gregg reinstatement, the judiciary has been “tinkering with the machinery of death”79 and
trying to fine-tune the contradictions. Courts have had to grapple with the
seemingly irreconcilable interests of ensuring that parties who face the death
penalty receive individualized consideration of their special circumstances
and ensuring that certain defendants aren’t put to death based on morally
impermissible considerations like race and class. As this tinkering has
dragged on with still-imperfect results, it becomes more and more apparent
that the this contradiction is inherent in the system and that the institution
of the death penalty itself is fatally flawed.
As the Supreme Court has been confronted with different challenges to
different aspects of the death penalty, it has faced the question whether
capital punishment serves any legitimate penological function. It has
considered historic and modern trends in penal theory,80 the work product
of state legislatures, trends in jury sentencing,81 the direction of legislative
changes,82 international norms,83 and the Justices’ own notions about the
acceptability of the death penalty84 to assess “the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” If some component
of capital punishment does not meet one of the legitimate ends of criminal
justice, then it should be discarded as cruel and unusual punishment.

Penology and The Aims of Criminal Justice
Penology is the study of crime and punishment. It concerns itself with the
philosophy and practice of crime suppression and the ramifications of crimesuppression practices for society.85 It identifies four distinct operational
theories that govern society’s efforts at crime suppression—rehabilitation,
deterrence, incapacitation and retribution.86 If the state demands that a life
be given in service of one of the aims of criminal punishment, it must have
some legitimate purpose. Otherwise, it violates the social contract. As will
be shown below, the death penalty satisfies no legitimate penological goal.
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I. Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation seeks to rehabilitate and reform an offender to allow him
or her to reintegrate back into society.87 Various schemes help to facilitate
rehabilitation including community service, mental health counseling,
substance abuse programs, job training, and victim-offender encounters.88
The idea is to eliminate the negative influences on an offender’s life while
developing positive influences and strengthening the offender’s ties to the
community. Poetically, the practice of rehabilitation is the quest to relocate
an offender’s misplaced humanity.
The Court, for obvious reasons, considers rehabilitation to be an irrelevant penological consideration for death penalty cases. As Justice Stewart
recognized in his concurrence in Furman,
The penalty of death differs from all other forms of criminal punishment,
not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total irrevocability. It is unique
in its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic purpose of criminal
justice. And it is unique, finally, in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”89 Subsequent cases before the Court have
consistently considered only deterrence and retribution as valid penological
considerations in death penalty cases.90

Because of the procedural protections that govern how death sentences
are carried out, a capital inmate spends an average of 176 months, nearly
fifteen years, on death row before execution.91 This penal purgatory provides
an excellent opportunity for an offender to receive rehabilitative programming. In the event that death row inmates find themselves released from
their capital sentences either because of actual innocence or for procedural
reasons, it would benefit the offenders and their communities were they to
emerge equipped with some level of training in the skills required in polite
society. Nevertheless, the Court continues to refuse to acknowledge the
value of rehabilitation for capital inmates.
The classic study of inmates released as a result of post-Furman commutations convincingly demonstrates that death row inmates can be rehabilitated.92 For example, Evans v. Muncy93 involved a Virginia inmate convicted
of murder and sentenced to death after a jury found that “if allowed to live
Evans would pose a serious threat of future danger to society.”94 This was
the sole aggravating factor warranting a death sentence instead of a sentence
of life without parole. Three years later, Evans found himself in the midst
of a prison riot with multiple hostages taken. Guards and nurses taken hostage later swore affidavits that Evans “took decisive steps to calm the riot,
saving the lives of several hostages, and preventing the rape of one of the
nurses.”95 Evans claimed that his uncontested heroic action was proof that
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he posed no serious threat of future danger to society and that accordingly,
he should not have been sentenced to death. The Supreme Court declined
to entertain his petition for a stay, and he was executed.
Is it possible that Evans had been rehabilitated by his three year stay on
death row? We will never know what was in his heart or whether his case
speaks to the possibility of rehabilitation on death row. We do know that
on average, death row inmates are no more violent then offenders in the
general prison population and that they respond positively to programming
opportunities and privileges.96 We also know, as Justice Marshall noted in
his concurrence in Furman, that “[d]eath, of course, makes rehabilitation
impossible.”97

II. Deterrence
Deterrence seeks to reduce criminal activity by using punishment as a
warning or threat. Deterrence seeks to impose serious consequences, thus
discouraging people from undertaking antisocial activities.98 The death
penalty serves as the state’s ultimate deterrent. Specific deterrence seeks
to dissuade the individual malefactor from recidivism, while general deterrence seeks to deter others from crime.99 Punishment serves a closely
related educational function in the hope that when people know what the
punishment is for criminal activity, they will be dissuaded. The death penalty
serves no function as a specific deterrent. Once executed, a person can no
longer be deterred; he or she is only incapacitated, which will be discussed
below. The only relevant question , therefore, is whether execution serves
a general deterrent function.
Statistics demonstrate that the murder rate in states that do not have capital
punishment is notably lower then states that embrace capital punishment
enthusiastically.100 Those statistics fail to account for glaring discrepancies
in poverty and education rates. A study done in 2008 indicates that the
consensus of criminologists, north of 88% of those surveyed, say the death
penalty “does not add any significant deterrent effect above that of longterm imprisonment.”101 A 1995 survey asked police chiefs, “What, in your
opinion, works in the battle against crime?” The expanded use of the death
penalty was the choice of only 1% of respondents, ranking well behind
social programs addressing drug abuse, improved economic opportunity,
improved education, and more police officers on the streets.102 However,
other studies can be found to validate the practice.103 In its 2012 metaanalysis, the National Research Council concluded that “research to date
is not informative about whether capital punishment decreases, increases,
or has no effect on homicide rates[;] [t]herefore, these studies should not
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be used to inform deliberations requiring judgments about the effect of the
death penalty on homicide.”104
It cannot be demonstrated that the death penalty has any value as an
effective deterrent. Thus, this argument for capital punishment ought to
be abandoned. The connection between capital punishment and general
deterrence is too tenuous and too ephemeral to be considered a legitimate
reason to continue the practice. As Justice Stevens put it, “[t]he legitimacy
of deterrence as an acceptable justification for the death penalty is also
questionable, at best. Despite 30 years of empirical research in the area,
there remains no reliable statistical evidence that capital punishment, in
fact deters potential offenders. In the absence of such evidence, deterrence
cannot serve as a sufficient penological justification for this uniquely severe
and irrevocable punishment.”105
Assuming, in arguendo, that it could be conclusively demonstrated that
capital punishment does have some value as a general deterrent to criminality, the practice would still be unacceptable. A liberal state has a moral
responsibility to persuade with reason, not to cow with fear. While the “terror of some power” may have been acceptable for early modern pessimists
like Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and his ideological progeny won the
great debate over how a legitimate government should behave. The threat
of death as a social deterrent hearkens back to a medieval mindset when
the “ritualized and regulated application of violence on the state’s behalf”
was used to “shock spectators and to reaffirm divine and temporal authority” in a “theater of horror.”106 As a society, we ought to have moved away
from that kind of barbarity. It is time our penological methods reflect that.

III. Incapacitation
Incapacitation as a penological goal seeks to remove a specific offender
from society.107 The death penalty makes that removal permanent. Incapacitation is a close cousin to specific deterrence in that it seeks to proactively
prevent future offending by a specific offender. While deterrence aims to
reduce the probability of future offending through the imposition of undesirable consequences, incapacitation seeks to remove an offender from society.
In that regard, the penological philosophy of incapacitation abandons the
notion of appealing to the better angels of an offender’s nature. There is no
lesson to learn, no element of rehabilitation or reeducation, no attempts to
salvage some humanity from the offender; there is merely an effort to limit an
offender’s ability to cause future harm through the crudest means available.
While incapacitation may have a straightforward appeal and be tempt-
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ingly practical, divorced from lofty notions about humanity and restorative
justice, utilizing the death penalty for incapacitation is excessive. If the aim
of incapacitation is solely to remove an offender from society to prevent the
offender from being able to offend again, a term of natural life in prison
would serve that end.
In the four decades since the reinstatement of the death penalty, a recurring
concern for the Court has been proportionality and excessiveness. When
a punishment is excessive, it becomes cruel and unusual.108 The Court has
created a two-part test for excessiveness: “[f]irst, the punishment must not
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain . . . [and s]econd,
the punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.”109 Under the penological purpose of incapacitation, the death penalty
fails that test. While murder is a severe offense and the punishment for
murder should also be severe, the penological aim of incapacitation is not
about meting out justice or serving up revenge. Incapacitation is pragmatic
and utilitarian, concerned solely with removing an offender from society.
The death penalty is not being used to incapacitate criminal masterminds or
notorious escape artists; it is applied to an unlucky cross-section of murderers no more difficult to incapacitate through a life sentence than any other
offender.110 Modern prisons are more than capable of dealing with even
the most hardened offenders.111 Extreme isolation in ‘SuperMax’ prisons
presents ethical issues of its own, however.112
In 1764, the Italian jurist, Enlightenment philosopher, and pioneering
penologist Cesare Beccaria derided the death penalty as “a war of a whole
nation against a citizen whose destruction they consider as necessary or
useful to the general good.”113 Utilizing the death penalty as a means of
incapacitation is as disproportionate and excessive as the asymmetrical
warfare of a nation against a citizen. Accordingly, the death penalty does not
meet the purposes of incapacitation. If the death penalty is to be justified,
it will have to be through some other penological purpose.

IV. Retribution
Retribution as a penological goal seeks to impose just desert punishment
on an offender for wrongdoing.114 Of the four penological models of crime
suppression, retribution is the only one that is backward-looking, seeking
to deliver punishment proportional to the offense. As public policy, retribution seems to scratch the innate itch for justice to see the guilty righteously
punished for their transgressions. In that way, retribution is penology being the most honest with itself. It may be argued that the societal need for
retributive justice is hardwired into our primate brains. The philosophical
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debate between Locke and Hobbes about the nature of man and government is paralleled in biology. In the late eighteenth century, post-Origin
of Species,115 the English evolutionary biologist and “Darwin’s Bulldog,”
Thomas Huxley, found himself defending evolutionary competition not only
against the religious and political conventions of the day but also against a
small minority who were unwilling to discount the evolutionary power of
cooperation and mutual aid. Huxley believed “violence in the evolutionary past to have been frequent and adaptive[,]” leaving modern humans
with a legacy of “dominance hierarchies and relatively frequent deaths
from aggression.”116 In contrast, Pytor Kropotkin, the Russian naturalist
and anarchist philosopher, believed humans to be “a naturally benign and
unaggressive species, comparable to primates that have a consistently low
frequency of conflict” and that violence was largely a product of “recent
cultural novelties.”117 Recent literature suggests that they were both right.118
A distinction exists between “reactive violence,” violence that erupts from
a swell of anger, frustration, or fear, and “proactive violence[,]” which is
planned and calculated. Human brains, it seems, are hardwired with a lower
propensity for reactive aggression compared to our closest primate cousins
and a higher propensity for proactive aggression.119 Biologically, human
nature has no requirement for blind, reactive violence. However, regardless of whether humans are hard wired to violence and vengeance, or to
cooperative behavior, retributive philosophy seeks to circumvent individual
violence by placing the power to punish with the state. Thus retribution,
whatever its origins, seeks to regularize the imposition of state violence.
As such, it must be subservient to larger criminological aims. And here it
founders. The one thing that any retributive philosophy is aimed at avoiding
is the consequentialism of utilitarian theories that allow for the execution
of the innocent. We know that we execute the innocent. Moreover, so long
as humans are prone to error, that risk cannot be eliminated. Therefore,
retribution as a basis for the death penalty has an Achilles heel.120
The Supreme Court seems to acknowledge the tension inherent in validating reactive, itch-scratching violence as state policy. In Furman, the Court
had a colloquy amongst its members about the validity of retribution as a
penological goal. Justice Stewart insisted that “[t]he instinct for retribution is
part of the nature of man, and channeling that instinct in the administration
of criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability
of a society governed by law.”121 Justice Marshall, however, was unwilling
to give retribution the Court’s imprimatur. “Retaliation, vengeance, and
retribution have been roundly condemned as intolerable aspirations for a
government in a free society . . . the Eighth Amendment itself was adopted
to prevent punishment from becoming synonymous with vengeance . . . [t]o
preserve the integrity of the Eighth Amendment, the Court has consistently
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denigrated retribution as a permissible goal of punishment.”122 Ultimately
the Court was unable to reach a consensus on the validity of retribution as
a penological aim. The Court only agreed that the death penalty is valid as
predicated on one of the penological goals, though never saying which.123
Retribution as a social policy is as old as the code of Hammurabi, the lex
talionis, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; yet, as a matter of practice,
we no longer take eyes for eyes or teeth for teeth. The death penalty is the
only remaining instance of the punishment imposed literally matching
the crime. Every other transgression against person or community can be
reduced into a term of imprisonment, community service, or fine, and yet
we continue to insist that a certain few deaths every year be met with corresponding death. The practice is an anachronism.
The families of victims of capital crimes may call for the murderers of
their loved ones to be torn apart fistful by bloody, screaming fistful; this
instinct is understandable and appropriate, but we recognize that there is no
place in modern society for that kind of horror. The social contract requires
citizens to yield their personal interests in vengeance to the state. While it
may be tempting to heed the cry of the victims of capital crimes, to pay due
deference to the family left behind calling for vengeance, a liberal state must
resist that impulse. The state acts in the place of the injured party to seek
justice, though when it does so, it must consider factors separate from the
righteous blood-lust of the injured parties. Questions of humanity, restraint,
decency, and national aspiration are beyond the scope of the individual
wronged party, but these ideals must always be considered by the liberal
state. As Justice Marshall articulated in Furman, “the Eighth Amendment
is our insulation from our baser selves.”124 Because the urge for retribution is not a necessary component of human nature, because retribution is
outmoded, and because we can live without it, we should live without it.
In his concurrence in Furman, Justice White said that when divorced from
the social ends it was deemed to serve, the death penalty becomes “the pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to any
discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns
to the state would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment
violative of the Eighth Amendment.”125 Here, it has been demonstrated that
the death penalty no longer serves any discernible social or public purpose.
The death penalty is not effective as a form of rehabilitation; it is dubious
as a deterrent; it is excessive as a means of incapacitation; and it is both
unseemly and unnecessary as a form of retribution. Accordingly, it should
be abandoned.
Sentencing capital offenders to significant terms of confinement in prison
with rehabilitative programing and the possibility of eventual release satisfies
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all of the penological aims of crime suppression while remaining within the
aspirational confines of the liberal state. A significant term of confinement
is severe enough to deter members of the community from considering
criminality while efficiently incapacitating the offender and neutralizing
his or her ability to cause future harm. A significant term of confinement
satisfies the desire for retribution without debasing the convicted party
and discrediting the state in the process. Finally, a significant term of
confinement with an eventual release date, even decades into the future,
acknowledges the basic humanity of the offender, the offender’s ability to
change, and the possibility of rehabilitation. Respecting life and honoring
the indelible humanity of the citizenry are fundamental first principles upon
which the liberal state was founded.

The Death Penalty is Inconstant with Liberal Values
As demonstrated above, the death penalty serves no legitimate penological
purpose that cannot be met through a term of significant incarceration and
rehabilitation. It must then be asked, what societal function does the death
penalty serve? While there is an argument to be made that the death penalty
exists because it enjoys marginal popularity, meager popular support cannot
suffice to justify a public policy as consequential as capital punishment.
Capital punishment currently holds a slim popular majority nationwide.
In a 2016 Pew Research poll, only 49% of respondents favor the death penalty for people convicted of murder, while 42% oppose the death penalty.126
This figure represents a 40-year low in the death penalty’s popularity, down
from a high of 78% approval in the mid-1990s.127 Among the reasons for
the decline in support for the death penalty since the 1990s is an increasing awareness of actual innocence; 71% of Americans surveyed say that
there is some risk that an innocent person will be put to death, and only
26% believe the institution has sufficient safeguards against the execution
of innocents.128 In 2018, the percentage of capital punishment supporters
rose to 54% with 39% in opposition.129
Capital punishment continues to enjoy a degree of popularity. Voters seem
to approve of it and politicians run on it because it feels good to scratch the
itch of retribution, but democratic approval alone does not make the practice
inherently valid. The Court considers a number of factors, including public
sentiment, when evaluating the “evolving standards of decency” that inform
cruel and unusual punishment,130 but a thin majority of public opinion is a
flimsy consideration in matters of life and death. Democracy is important,
but it is not the raison d’être of the liberal state. The will of the majority must
always be tempered by respect for the rights of the minority. Our inalienable
natural rights ought not be decided by the ebb and flow of popular opinion.
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The death penalty is a favorite implement of some of the world’s most
repressive and repugnant regimes. The countries with the highest instances
of capital punishment are, in descending order, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Iraq, Pakistan, Egypt, Somalia, and the United States.131 To be fair, the lion’s
share of the world’s annual executions occur in the top five countries, with
the United States executing 23 people in 2017 compared to Saudi Arabia’s
146 and China’s 1,000-plus.132 However, in the past decade, the U.S. has
held a position among the top-five executing nations on several occasions.133
The inclusion of the U.S. on such an ugly and ignominious list ought to be
cause for public concern.
Repressive regimes use the death penalty as a means of social control,
not only for the removal of citizens the state considers inconvenient but
more broadly to cultivate a sense of fear in the population at large. When a
population knows that its government can lay claim to citizens’ lives, the
relationship between citizen and state changes. In that way, the death penalty serves as an omnipresent reminder of the state’s awesome and horrible
power. In her essay, The Liberalism of Fear, the political theorist Judith
Shklar asserted that “systematic fear is the condition that makes freedom
impossible and it is aroused by the expectation of institutional cruelty and by
nothing else.”134 Where the threat of institutional cruelty and systemic fear
exist, true freedom cannot. Because freedom and fear seem to be mutually
exclusive, the United States ought to finally rid itself of the institution of
capital punishment.

Conclusion
On October 11, 2018, in a unanimous en banc decision, the Supreme
Court of Washington State ruled that the state’s death penalty scheme
was unconstitutional as applied.135 The Court held that the “arbitrary and
racially biased manner” in which the death penalty had been imposed was
violative of state constitutional protections against the infliction of cruel
punishments.136 Washington now joins 19 other states and the District of
Columbia in rejecting the death penalty either through popular referendum or
judicial edict.137 This development is welcome and happy news for libertarian
skeptics, constitutional purists and, most especially, the death row inmates
of Washington State whose capital sentences have been converted to life
imprisonment. It remains unsatisfying, however, that the decision addressed
only the flaws in Washington’s capital punishment scheme as applied, and
not the system itself. While laudable in its result, the Washington Supreme
Court’s opinion continues ignores the greater point that the death penalty
is always incompatible with our professed values.
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By birth or naturalization, Americans have entered into a social contract
with the state. This contract guarantees people’s natural rights, which
exist outside of the political realm: life and liberty. When a person has
transgressed with sufficient severity against the state, his or her liberty
may be curtailed to serve the greater good, but it is not justifiable to take
the transgressor’s life. Capital punishment is demonstrably devoid of any
legitimate penological purpose that cannot be achieved through a term of
imprisonment and rehabilitative programming. In that way, the death penalty
is gratuitous and excessive and inches ever closer to constitutional rebuke
with every passing day. History has been on a slow march toward eliminating the death penalty for the last five decades. It is time now to finally and
totally acknowledge that the death penalty is so fundamentally flawed that
no amount of tinkering with the machinery can save it. As an institution,
the death penalty is morally disquieting, contrary to our American aspirations, and grotesquely illiberal. It is time now to consign the practice to
the dustbin of history.
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